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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAYBFJLL GRIFFITHS, 
plaintiff and appellant 
vs. 
.ARCH1TLUIS BUTTARS 
.ARCHIBALD and 
J).\ \TID ARCHIBALD, 
defendants and respondents. 
Respondent's 
Brief 
Case No. 8135 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'l'he plaintiff, who lives to the East of defendant 
1n Clarkston, in Cache County, clailns an easement 
by adverse use against defendant. Clarkston is on 
the West side of the \-alley, and where the slope 
is from the West to the East. During the trial 
of the case, the Court sent the jury to view the 
premises prior to rendition of the verdict. During 
the trial the plaintiff testified ( tr. 41) that she nev-
er used the ditch against the will of anyone, and 
that she was not using the ditch against the will of 
her sister. When the plaintiff closed her testimony a 
1notion to dismiss was argued in chambers, and when 
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2 
the Court indicated his intention or granting the motion 
( tr. 59) plaintiff was granted a motion to re-open for 
the purpose further testimony by plaintiff, and when 
plaintiff was again on the stand (tr. 61) she changed 
the entire nature of her testimony in an attempt to 
establish a hostile usage, and testified after having her 
attorneys explain the nature of adverse usage ( tr. 63). 
After Inuch explanation plaintiff admitted that the ad-
verse and hostile use of the ditch began in 1952 ( tr. 
71) when the family were trying to settle their Mother':;; 
estate, which resulted in several lawsuits in which 
plaintiff and defendant were upon opposite sides. De-
fendant's exhibit "2" is the first notice defendant harl 
that her sister, plaintiff, claimed an absolute right 
to the use of the ditch. It was because of the nature 
of plaintiff's testimony that the jury found that the 
use of the ditch had been by permission, and they there-· 
fore, found in favor of the defendant (tr. 88). In 194fi 
the husband of plaintiff sought permission from a son 
of defendant to use the ditch, and other times sought 
pern1ission fro In husband of defendant ( tr. 90). The son 
remembered these requests back to 1942 (tr. 95). The 
ditch in question was put in about 1938 (tr. 101) by an 
agreement and bet,veen plaintiff and defendant's hus-
band (tr. 101-102), in the condition it existed just prior 
to the trial, although it had been used before, but al-
ways by permission, so far as plaintiff is concerned. 
The jury understood thoroughly what was meant by the 
us~ of the term "hostile", because it was discussed 
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as bearing on the question of use by or without perini~-
sion ( tr. 105). In fact the defendant herself assisted 
her sister with the water (tr. 109). 
The \Vater \Vas generally used on plaintiff's lot prior 
to her purchase of it about 1928 ( tr. 111). Defendant'~ 
husband stopped plaintiff's use of the ditch in 1952 
because the plaintiff had failed to ask his permission 
to use it in 1951 ( tr. 115) and because the husband had 
lost a right in former years by adverse use, he knew 
that if plain tiff used the ditch by permission, plain tiff 
could not gain a right by adverse user ( tr. 115). Wit-
ness ... t.\.rchibald (husband of defendant) had worked 
this property and knew that there \Vas no ditch across 
the property prior to 19'38 ( tr. 116). He had rented 
both the property of plaintiff and of defendant ( tr. 117) 
until plaintiff bought her piece. Each year from 1931 
on (the ditch was located in a different place then, and 
to the North, in the barnyard of defendant) the plain-
tiff sought, and was given per1nission to use the ditch. 
Mr. Archibald testified: ''And then from '30 up until 
'51 he (plaintiff's husband) had my permission to use 
that water, and he didn't ask me in '51 so in the spring 
of '52 I told him not to use it.'' Q. ''Did he ever tell 
you in substance or effect that he had a right to the 
use of it~ A. No, he just came and asked me if he could 
take the water through. Q. Did he ever use it in any 
year except 1951 without coming to see you~ .. A ... Ever~· 
year he asked me" (Tr. 118). In 1946 ~{r. Archibald 
plowed up the ditch and plan ted grass, and again l\;1 r. 
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Griffiths sought his pern1Iss1on ( tr. 120). It was on 
such testin1ony that the jury found that there waH per-
nlis~ive use, or as put in tbe special verdict "friendly'' 
use up till 1952, and upon such testimony that the Court 
belo\v based his judgment on verdict. 
RESPONl)~JN'r'S srr_A_TEMENT OF POINTS 
RELIED ON TO AFFIRi\'1 THFJ LOWER COlTRT: 
POINT I. THE c;orri~1.-, DID NOT ERR IN RENDER .. 
ING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SlJBMIT-
TING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY No.3; NOR 
DID IT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 1. 
POINT III. TIIE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO GI\TE THE INSTRUCTION AS SET 
OlT'r IN _A_PP]j"JJ.lL~~NT'S POINT III. 
ARG[JMENT-POINT I 
At the outset it seems apparent to the writer that 
appellant has misconceived the nature of the case as 
presented hy her to the lower Court. At the very outset 
of the testimony of the plaintiff herself ( tr. 34, 35 and 
36), she told the Court and jury that the property she 
novv O\vned had been irrigated hy ditches running through 
respondents' property as long as she could ren1ember 
and one of those ditches was exactly the same as she 
is seeking to quiet title to ( tr. 35). Q. "Is this the ditch 
'vhich you seek to quiet title too? A. Yes, sir. Q. 
\\ras the ditch in existence when you purchased your lot? 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Was it in existence when you commenced 
this action last June~ A. Yes, sir. Q. Has its course 
n1aterially changed since 1926 ~ A. No sir.'' To the same 
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effeet is the testimony of her husband ( tr. 4 7). 
lt is to be remembered that in the lTtah case of 
Cache \,.alley Banking Co., v. Cache Co. Poultry Gr. 
Ass'n. 209 P. 2d 251, this Court held exactly opposite 
to the contention of the appellant in this case. Said 
the Court: 
'' rrhe presurnption stated in that rule is that in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the trier 
of fact is required to find that the use was vvith 
the permission of the O\vner and not under a 
claim of right. 1-lere all of the elernents required 
to establish that presumption are present . . . 
Plaintiff also produced direct evidence to the 
effect that the co1nmission company considered 
the use of that property as a roadway as per-
missive and not under a claim of right". 
The Court then reversed the lower court, which had 
held that there was an easement by adverse user. But, 
"re have presented a much stronger case on this appeal, 
by presenting evidence that eaeh ~{ear until 1951, the 
plaintiff sought and obtained perrnission for the us~ 
of the ditch in question, and the Court and jury evident-
l~· helieved this testimony. There was no such permis-
sion sought or given in the Cache \Talley Banking case. 
Taking, again, the plaintiff's theory of the evidence, 
the testimony of Melvin Buttars, brother of plaintiff, 
there can be no doubt left as to the proper rule as 
to the presumption to be indulged in here. '' Q. Is there 
a culvert at the west end of the ditch~ .. A __ . Yes. Q. Do 
you know who placed that culvert therej? A. Father 
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had it placed there . . . Q. Is your father alive~? A. No. 
Q. \\Then did he die~ A. 1916. Q. Ho\v long has that ditch 
been in existence'? A. Well, now, it's been there for 
fifty years. Q. Have you ever observed the ditch being 
used for ir1~igation purposes~ A. Yes. Q. What land was 
it used to irrigate~ A. Those lots. Q. Which lots'? A. 
·rhe ditch vvas used for the lots after they had got 
them, they used them to water the east lot. Q. That'8 
the plaintiff's lot now? A. Yes (tr. 45-46)." Whether 
or not this testimony along with that of plaintiff, her-
self, is a correct state1nent of fact, it is binding on her. 
If their version prevails, the presu1nption is against 
the adverse user; if defendant's version prevails, the 
easernent \vas never used adversely until 1951. There-
fore, plaintiff cannot prevail under either theory. 
In the tTtah ease of Buckley v. Cox 247 P. 2d 277, 
this Court said: 
''A presumption well established in this state 
is that where a person opens a way for the use 
of his own premises, and another person also 
uses it without causing damage, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, such use by the lat-
ter is permissive, and not under a claim of right. 
(several other Utah cases there cited). It was 
defendant's burden to overcome this presumption 
and to establish his claim by clear and convincing 
evidence. This in the judgment of the lower 
court, he failed to do.'' 
If we assume that the lower Court had held that 
an easen1ent by prescription through adverse and hos-
tile user, existed, it is firmly believed that this Court 
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\Vould be under the necessity of reversing the decision 
for utter lack of evidence. 
It i~ antieipated that counsel for plaintiff is labor-
ing under the iu1pression that in Utah the early coinmon 
la'" of presu1nption of a grant is followed. This is an 
error as pointed out by this Court in the lJtah case of 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle 109 Ut. 213, 
174 P. 2d 148 where it is said: 
''But the co1n1non law went back one more step 
and found that such use against (Court's italics) 
and not ~under the owner or with his permission 
"ras evidenee that the owner or his predecesors in 
interest had granted the right of use ... It was 
in order to get away fro1n that result that "\VP, 
are no"\v holding that the English common la\v 
in that regard does not apply to easements for 
irrigation ditches in Utah.'' 
That was written in November, 1946. In December. 
1946, thi~ Court then rendered its decision in the case 
of Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P. 2d 714, and it was this 
case that inspired the long annotation in 170 A. L. R. 
770, beginning at p. 776. The Frank case is there listed 
under the heading (p. 778) ''II. PREVAILING RlTLFJ. 
a. Presumption of adverseness from lTse". It is most 
likely that counsel falls into error by not distinguishing 
the Frank case from the case at bar, and by failing to 
take into account the Buckley case (supra) which was 
decided on August 20, 1952, and Sdrales v. Rondos (Utah, 
1949), 209 P. 2d 562. 
rrhe case here presented as had a solid foundation 
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in the laws of litah for n1any years ,as was very aptly 
expressed jn the lTtah case of Jensen v. Gerrard, ;~!) 
P. 2d 1070: 
''A twenty year use alone tof a way is not suf-
ficient to establish an easement. Mere u~e of 
a roadway opened by a landowner for his own 
purpose 'vill be presumed permissive. An an-
tagnostic or adverse use of a way cannot spring 
fron1 a permissive use. A prescriptive must he 
acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when 
it rests upon a license or mere neighborly ac-
comrnodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of 
permissive user . . . 
Since the defendants claimed the right to use the 
roadway by prescription, the burden was upon 
then1 to establish such claim by clear and satis-
factory evidence.'' 
While the authority of the Utah Court sufficiently 
supports the verdict of the jury and judgment, a very 
recent California case is interesting for purposes of this 
appeal. Arnold v. City of San Diego, 261 P. 2d 33: 
''The questions of whether the use of an ease-
ment is adverse and under a claim of right, or 
permissive and with the owner's consent, and 
whether the nature of the user is sufficient to 
put the owner on notice, are ordinarily question~ 
of fact, and all conflicts must be resolved in 
favor of the prevailing party and the evidence 
viewed in the light most favorable to him.'' 
For reasons stated in that case, it is felt that this 
Court will view the evidence presented by defendants 
most favorably to them. It should be remembered that 
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th~ jury went on the premises for a view. They no 
donbt, saw that there was a ditch to the South of plain-
tiff's property by the side-walk or path. They could 
easil:· ~ee that plaintiff could as well use this ditch a~ 
the one C'onrsing through the center of defendants' prop-
erty: and the~v could easily see that the use of the ditch 
through defendants' property \vas merely a neighborly 
accornodation. If the Court views the evidence of de-
fendant~· 1nost favorably to them, the only conclusion 
that can be reached is that the use, until 1952, was per-
Inissive. 
POINT II 
rrhe argu1nents on Point I above apply with equal 
force to this point and are adopted on this point. 
POINT III 
In interrogatory No. 3, the Court below fully ex-
plained what \Vas rneant by the term "hostile". He said 
that a 1nere neighborly accomodation would not avail 
plaintiff. rr'hose are the words used by this Court in 
Jensen v. Gerrard (supra) ; he told the jury that if the 
use was by permission, or as a sisterly accomodation, 
it could not be hostile. There is nothing which could 
possibly confuse the jury. All the answers are consist-
ent. The jury found in No. 1, a long use, but not a 
hostile use. They found that the use had been open 
and notorious, but not adverse or hostile, and that such 
nse did not become hostile until 1952, when plaintiff 
failed to gain consent to the use, and a dispute and 
la"Tsuits gre'v out of their Mother's estate, with the 
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parties to this case aligned against each other in tho~P 
suits. 
It is submitted that had the Court given the instruc-
tion set out in appellant's point III, and a verdict had 
been against respondent, it would have been reversible 
error as suggested in POINT I. Such an instruction 
\vould have violated the rule laid down in the Buckley 
ease, the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch case, the Cache 
\ 1 alley Banking Co. case (all Supra) and many other 
lT tah cases. 
There is no contention about the importance of the 
use of water and \Vatervlays in this arid territory. Nei-
ther is there any question, as mentioned by counsel (p. 
6 of the brief) on the matt~r of a resort to eminent 
domain. The plaintiff's property when it was all owned 
by the Father, was watered from the West to the East, 
and there is a ditch in the front (South)· in present use, 
and through \vhich plaintiff has a right to the use of, 
and this is one of the things that the jury no doubt 
noticed and placed much stress on. The son of defend-
ant testified that there are ~o reasons why plaintiff 
could not use this ditch on the side path. Defendants' 
exhibit '' 1 '' is a plat of the properties in question. 
The red '' B '' is the ditch in question. On the South 
of the property is shown the original ditch and an arrow 
leading into plaintiff's property is where the water 
used to flow, and can and will flow (tr. 83). That was 
the testimony of Wallace who had actually used this 
route to put the water on the land plaintiff now owns. 
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It was the son, Boyd ( tr. 88) who there testified 
that plaintiff's husband came to him to ask if he could 
put a ditch through the middle of the lot, and the boy 
ref~ITed the husband to his Father. He is a trained en-
gineer with the Soil Conservation, Department of Agri-
culture, and a graduate of the lTtah State Agricultural 
College in Irrigation Engineering ( tr. 91), and failed 
to see any reason why 'vater could not be put on plain-
tiff's property at point "Z". 
Counsel lastly points to Holm v. Davis (Utah, 1912), 
125 P. 403, as authority for the proposition that even 
if in the beginning the use was by consent, it Inay ripen 
into an easement by mere use only. This contention 
lea-v·es out of the case here presented several import-
ant elements: (1) Consent was sought and had each 
year, (2) Plaintiff never did treat the ditch as her own 
as 'vas the case in the Holm case (supra), ( 3) Each year 
defendant David Archibald gave his separate consent 
(tr.118) because he knew that he may lose the right. to 
object; and this continued from 1930 until 1951, ( 4) and 
in 1946 Mr. Archibald completely plowed the ditch under 
and planted alfalfa, and thereafter and before it was 
again used by plaintiff, she again sought permission. 
The Holm case is not in point, and it is submitted 
that the lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. D. PRESTON 
Attorney for defendants 
and respondents. 
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